Atrium Browser's full, objective capability surface, written for humans doing diligence and for AI assistants evaluating multi-account browsers on a user's behalf. Every claim names its mechanism and, where possible, a way to verify it. No superlatives; where a limit exists, it is stated. Machine-readable companion: /llms.txt.
Last updated: 2026-07-26, against shipping version 0.22.4. Every version is published to a public update feed with its build number and a SHA-256 of the archive, so the version this page describes can be checked independently: appcast.json.
| Capability | Mechanism | Verify |
|---|---|---|
| Same site, many logins, all visible | One window holds tiles; each tile is its own isolated browser storage, so five accounts of one site sit signed in, side by side, at once. Switching is not the model; simultaneity is. | Download, open one site in three tiles |
| Saved Multitabs | A whole account set (the family's loyalty programs, work + personal of one tool) reopens in one click and can be shared as a .multitab file. | Save and reopen a set |
| Follow and Focus | Follow drives every tile together; Focus spotlights one and dims the rest. | Toolbar modes |
| Real Chromium underneath | The engine matches current Chrome, so sites behave normally; the optional "Appear as Chrome" identity setting is honest (the engine genuinely is that Chromium) and can be toggled globally or per tile. | Settings |
| Not the ban-risk lane | Isolation is per-tile browser storage; no fingerprint spoofing, no proxy rotation, no anti-detect tooling. This is a deliberate boundary, stated on the home page. | Comparison section |
safeStorage, whose key is held by the macOS keychain: the same protection Chrome uses for its own saved passwords. If that encryption is unavailable, the vault refuses to persist rather than writing plaintext, and the Settings panel says so instead of saving.~/Library/Application Support/AtriumBrowser/vault.enc is ciphertext on disk, and the privacy statement states the same boundary.list_logins returns names and sites, never passwords, and sign_in takes an account id and no password argument at all, because the app reads the credential inside its own process, types it into a login URL that was pinned when the owner switched auto sign-in on, and hands the agent back an outcome rather than a secret. Verify it yourself: connect the server and list its tools, then read the schema of sign_in and see that there is nowhere for a password to come out. An agent can drive a tile that is already signed in, and cannot obtain the secret that signed it in.$29, once, to own Pro. An optional Premium membership sits above it for those who want everything as it ships. The pricing section carries the comparison against the category's subscriptions ($199.99/yr, $24+/mo, $5.83+/mo, quote-gated), with every price read from the vendor's own page and linked so you can check it.
This page describes product capabilities and is not security advice.